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CONTRADICTORY OR COMPATIBLE? 

ARTHUR M. WOLFSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, two significant developments reflected the attitudes of 
big business toward the value of racial difference. That year, the 
Supreme Court decided the landmark cases Gratz v. Bollinger! and 
Grutter v. Bollinger2 to address the constitutionality of race-based 
affirmative action in university admissions policies. Those rulings 
marked the culmination of support offered by representatives of big 
business for such policies, voiced through their filings of amici 
briefs.3 Indeed, the significance of that support was not lost on the 
Court, as the Grutter majority specifically incorporated references 
to it in its rationale.4 That same year, social scientists Marianne 
Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan published a study revealing a 
marked pattern of race-based discrimination in the hiring process of 
* Candidate for J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2005; B.A., College 
of William & Mary, 1999. I would like to thank Professors Lu-in Wang, Richard Del­
gado, and Jean Stefancic for their insightful comments on earlier drafts and their sup­
port in publishing this Article. I would also like to thank Professor James Flannery and 
Dean David Herring for their ongoing leadership and guidance. 
1. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
2. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
3. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses, Gratz v. Bollin­
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 
02-516) [hereinafter Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses]; Brief of Amici Curiae 
Media Companies, Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus Cu­
riae Gen. Motors Corp., Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae BP America, Inc., Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae ExxonMobii Corp., Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516). 
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 
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a cross-section of American business.5 The study has received wide 
ranging acclaim as a legitimate indicator of the discrimination it 
reveals.6 
These two developments appear wildly contradictory. The 
briefs appear to represent a recognition of the value of increasing 
minority employment on the part of big business. As such, a study 
revealing significant patterns of race-based discrimination in the 
hiring process would seem antithetical to the support reflected in 
the briefs. Why would representatives of big business refuse to hire 
members of the very minorities whose employment they seem to 
embrace in the briefs? 
A close examination, however, of the support offered by repre­
sentatives of big business in the Gratz and Grutter litigation reveals 
that no such contradiction exists. Such an examination reveals that 
the primary rationale for this support is not to increase minority 
hiring. Indeed, while an interest in increasing minority employment 
is present in the briefs, the primary interest asserted is in hiring 
employees who have been exposed to minorities as students, not in 
necessarily hiring minorities themselves. Therefore, the support of 
big business for race-based affirmative action in university admis­
sions provides· no contradiction to the discriminatory hiring prac­
tices observed by Bertrand and Mullainathan. Rather, the two 
developments may be aptly viewed as quite compatible. 
This Article explores the apparent contradiction between the 
support big business gave to race-based affirmative action in uni­
versity admissions, reflected by the amici briefs in Gratz and Grut­
ter, and the racially discriminatory hiring practices revealed in the 
study conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan. Part I will describe 
the support big business offered for race-based affirmative action in 
the Gratz and Grutter cases. Part II will detail the study conducted 
by Bertrand and Mullainathan, paying particular attention to their 
assertion that the discrimination they describe is based on race. Fi­
nally, in Part III, I will more closely examine the rationales put 
forth in the amici briefs and compare those rationales to the find­
5. MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, ARE EMILY AND GREG 
MORE EMPLOYABLE THAN LAKISHA AND JAMAL? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON LABOR 
MARKET DISCRIMINATION, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER 9873 
(2003). 
6. See L.A. Johnson, Studies find that Afrocentric names often incur a bias, PITTS· 
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 2003, at D1; Alan B. Krueger, Sticks and Stones Can 
Break Bones, but the Wrong Name Can Make a Job Hard to Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2002, at C2. 
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ings of the study. In doing so, I will conclude that when taken to­
gether, the two appear to constitute a stark contradiction while, in 
actuality, they are indeed quite compatible. 
I. BIG BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcnON 
IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
The Gratz and Grutter litigation proved to be a landmark 
event in Supreme Court jurisprudence on a variety of fronts. From 
a legal standpoint, the case marked a statement of definition as to 
the relevant precedent on the matter.1 Outside the legal arena, the 
decisions had dramatic impact as well. The rulings charted the 
course of public policy organizations from across the political spec­
trum for the foreseeable future.s In the field of higher education, 
the outcome served to define admissions policies for colleges and 
universities across the country.9 For businesses, the decisions di­
rectly affected recruitment and hiring practices. IO Because its im­
pact reached so many sectors of society, interest in the case rose to 
abnormally high levels.u Accordingly, the filings of amici briefs oc­
curred in significantly high numbers.12 
Decided on the same day, Grutter and Gratz marked the first 
time the Supreme Court considered the use of race in higher educa­
tion admissions programs since Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke.13 
Both involved, inter alia, challenges based on the Equal Protection 
7. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321. Specifically, the Court accounted for the judicial con­
fusion surrounding Justice Powell's concurrence in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978). In that opinion, Powell opined that race could be considered in a 
university admissions policy for the purpose of attaining a diverse student body. Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 311 (Powell, J., concurring). The Grutter Court noted that circuits have 
been split as to the precedential value of that opinion. Grutter, 389 U.S. at 325 (com­
paring Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) and 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law 
School, 233 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000». The Grutter Court, however, chose not to de­
cide the precedential value of the Powell concurrence in Bakke but rather only the 
validity of its substance. Grutter, 389 U.S. 306; see also Thomas Ross, Innocence and 
Affirmative Action, 43 V AND. L. REV. 297, 307 (1990) (noting in 1990 that "the constitu­
tional status of affirmative action remains uncertain"). 
8. See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amici Curiae, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516). 
9. See Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at 
the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (2003). 
10. See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 3, at 9. 
11. Warren Richey, Court Takes Up Racial Preferences in Landmark Case, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2003, at 4. 
12. Id. 
13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003). 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for which a classification 
based on race may be deemed constitutional only if it serves a com­
pelling state interest and its means are narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.14 
In Gratz, the plaintiff challenged the use of race in the Univer­
sity of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy.15 While the 
particulars of the policy changed over time, it consistently yielded a 
result in which nearly all qualified African-Americans, Hispanics, 
and Native Americans were offered admission.16 In the final ver­
sion of the admissions policy in the period relevant to the litigation, 
the University employed a scale awarding applicants points for a 
variety of characteristicsP The maximum a candidate could 
achieve was 150 points, with 100 guaranteeing admission.18 The 
university awarded twenty additional points for membership in an 
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.19 
In Gratz, the petitioners were two white undergraduate appli­
cants to the University.20 Both were denied admission, even though 
the University's admissions office rated them as "well qualified" 
and "qualified" respectively.21 In October 1997, the petitioners 
filed a lawsuit claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 
The district court granted the petitioners' motion to certify the law­
suit as a class action on behalf of "those individuals who applied for 
and were not granted admission ... who are members of those ra­
cial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that defendants treated 
less favorably on the basis of race in considering their application 
for admission. "23 
The Supreme Court concluded that the admissions policy in its 
final form violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the plan was not narrowly tailored to meet 
the compelling state interest of educational diversity.24 In line with 
Grutter, the Court found the asserted state interest of educational 
14. Id. at 326-27. 
15. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253-57 (2003). 
16. See id. at 249-50. 
17. Id. at 255. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 251. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 252. 
23. Id. at 252-53. 
24. Id. at 275. The Court noted that it upheld the asserted compelling state inter­
est of educational diversity in Grutter. Id. at 268. 
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diversity to be compelling.25 However, the Court stated that the 
twenty additional points awarded for a candidate's membership in a 
racial minority constituted a "decisive" use of race in favor of "vir­
tually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority appli­
cant."26 It is this decisiveness in the policy's use of race that the 
Court found constitutionally troubling. Specifically, the Court ex­
plained that giving primacy to any single characteristic fails as a 
means to further educational diversity.27 
Grutter involved a challenge to the use of race in the admis­
sions policy of the University of Michigan Law School.28 Unlike 
the undergraduate admissions policy challenged in Gratz, the Law 
School admissions policy did not place a definitively quantifiable 
value on an applicant's membership in an underrepresented minor­
ity. Instead, the Law School sought to enroll a "'critical mass' of 
[underrepresented] minority students" by including race as a factor 
in admissions decisions.29 
The petitioner in Grutter was a white applicant to the Law 
School who was denied admission. 3D She filed suit in 1997, claiming 
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31 Specifically, the petitioner asserted that "her appli­
cation was rejected because the Law School uses race as a 'predom­
inant' factor, giving applicants who belong to certain minority 
groups 'a significantly greater chance of admission than students 
with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.' "32 
The Supreme Court found the Law School's admissions policy 
to be constitutional.33 Of particular importance, the Court settled 
the question of whether educational diversity, as asserted by Justice 
Powell in Bakke, constitutes a compelling state interest.34 The 
Court, however, bypassed the controversy as to whether Powell's 
opinion was binding by holding substantively that a state interest in 
educational diversity is compelling.35 The Court also found the 
25. Id. at 267. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003). 




33. Id. at 343-44. 
34. For a review of the legal controversy surrounding the precedential value of 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, see supra note 7. 
35. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. 
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Law School's means to be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.36 
Specifically, unlike the means rejected in Gratz, the Court ap­
proved the Law School's approach because it ascribed no fixed ben­
efit to an applicant's race but instead used race in determining 
admission in a "flexible, nonmechanical way."37 
The litigation of Gratz and Grutter produced interest from a 
multi-faceted cross-section of American society, marked notably by 
the filing of amici briefs at unprecedented proportions.38 Included 
in these filings were those from representatives of American busi­
ness who supported both the undergraduate and Law School's use 
of race in their respective admissions policies.39 (Because amici 
generally offered support for both the undergraduate and Law 
School programs together rather than separately, I will hereinafter 
collectively refer to them as "Michigan programs."). 
A brief submitted by sixty-five leading American businesses 
led the filings of amici briefs submitted by representatives of big 
business in support of the Michigan programs.40 In its introduction, 
the brief stated as its main purpose that diversity in higher educa­
tion is a compelling state interest, and that the Michigan programs 
should therefore be deemed constitutiona1.41 Central to the brief's 
argument was the link between educational diversity and specific 
business benefits derived therefrom.42 The brief's proponents iden­
tified four ways in which the education of students in diverse envi­
ronments bears fruit in business practices: 
First, a diverse group of individuals educated in a cross-cultural 
environment has the ability to facilitate unique and creative ap­
proaches to problem-solving arising from the integration of dif­
ferent perspectives. Second, such individuals are better able to 
develop products and services that appeal to a variety of consum­
ers and to market offerings in ways that appeal to those custom­
ers. Third, a racially diverse group of managers with cross­
36. Id. at 334. 
37. Id. 
38. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra note 3. The two most prominent amicus briefs submitted by repre­
sentatives of big business in support of the University of Michigan were the Brieffor 65 
Leading American Businesses and the Briefof General Motors Corporation. Both Exx­
onMobii Corporation and BP America submitted briefs in support of neither party. 
40. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 3. 
41. Id. at 2-3. Cf NAOMI KLEIN, No LoGO 107-24 (1999) (documenting how cor­
porate America ultimately embraced the idea of diversity in order to create "a candy­
coated multiculturalism," which has allowed "corporations ... to sell a single product in 
numerous countries without triggering the old cries of 'Coca-Colonization' "). 
42. Id. at 4. 
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cultural experiences is better able to work with business partners, 
employees, and clientele in the United States and around the 
world. Fourth, individuals who have been educated in a diverse 
setting are likely to contribute to a positive work environment, 
by decreasing incidents of discrimination and stereotyping.43 
General Motors Corporation filed a similar brief in support of 
the Michigan programs.44 Its brief, however, more narrowly de­
fined its interest in a university's consideration of race in admissions 
as the development of "cross-cultural competence. "45 The brief de­
fined this notion as "the capacities to interact with and to under­
stand the experiences of, and multiplicity of perspectives held by, 
persons of different races, ethnicities, and cultural histories."46 
General Motors asserted that the necessity of this trait is rooted in 
the expansiveness, and corresponding diversity, of the market it 
serves.47 Specifically, the proponents of the brief noted that "Gen­
eral Motors' employees, customers, and business partners ... could 
scarcely be more racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse."48 
Therefore, General Motors believed hiring workers with "cross-cul­
tural competence" would yield significant business benefits. 
Like the brief filed by sixty-five leading American businesses, 
the General Motors brief linked employees' development of cross­
cultural competence to their experience in a diverse educational 
setting.49 The brief noted: "[S]tudents are likely to acquire greater 
cross-cultural competence in a multicultural and multiracial aca­
demic environment, in which students and faculty of different cul­
tures and races interact, than they are in a homogeneous one, in 
which cross-cultural communication is merely a theoretical 
construct."50 
The input of the business community was not lost on the Court. 
In defining educational diversity as a compelling state interest in 
Grutter, the Court took note of the benefits of a university's attain­
ing a critical mass of diverse students for an array of interests in 
society.51 With respect to business, the Court noted, "[t]hese bene­
fits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have 
43. Id. at 7. 
44. Brief of Amici Curiae Gen. Motors Corp., supra .note 3. 
45. Id. at 4. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 2. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 4. 
50. Id. 
51. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
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made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global mar­
ketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."52 Therefore, the filings of 
the briefs by representatives of big business played a significant role 
in the Court's finding that educational diversity constituted a com­
pelling state interest such that the Law School's admissions pro­
gram was constitutional. 
II. REVIEW OF DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES 
The study conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan provides a 
significant account of racially discriminatory hiring practices among 
a cross-section of American businesses.53 The study compared re­
sumes submitted by job applicants with "very White sounding 
names"54 with those submitted by applicants with "very African 
American sounding names. "55 The results reveal a success rate of 
the former 50% higher than that of the latter.56 Put differently, as 
further delineated by the study, when compared with an African­
American sounding name, a white sounding name produces a bene­
fit to the applicant equal to an additional eight years of 
experience.57 
To conduct their study, Bertrand and Mullainathan sent re­
sumes to employers in response to help-wanted ads in Boston and 
Chicago.58 To each resume, they assigned a name deemed to be 
either "very White sounding" or "very African American sound­
ing."59 To classify names, the researchers relied on "frequency data 
calculated from birth certificates of all babies born in Massachusetts 
between 1974 and 1979."60 
The researchers also looked for disparities in the effect of dif­
52. Id. 
53. BERTRAND & MULLAINAlHAN, supra note 5, at 3 (examining "a large spec­
trum of job quality, from cashier work at retail establishments and clerical work in a 
mail room to office and sales management positions"). 
54. Id. at 2. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 2-3. 
57. Id. at 3. 
58. Id. at 2. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 7. Similar studies attesting to the notion of uniquely white or uniquely 
African-American names are found elsewhere. See Johnson, supra note 6, at D1 (citing 
the most popular baby names for black females, black males, white females, and white 
males in 2002 as compiled by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Bureau of 
Health Statistics). See generally Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes 
and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
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ferences in the credentials of job applicants with respect to each 
racial classification.61 Within each group, the researchers subdi­
vided the resumes into "higher quality applicants"62 and "lower 
quality applicants. "63 Each employer to whom the researchers re­
sponded received four resumes: a higher qualified applicant with a 
white sounding name, a lower qualified applicant with a white 
sounding name, a higher qualified applicant with an African-Amer­
ican sounding name, and a lower qualified applicant with an Afri­
can-American sounding name.64 
The results of the study reveal a marked pattern of racial dis­
crimination. A callback, via telephone or email, marked a success­
ful response to a resume submission.65 Whereas resumes with 
white sounding names had a 10.08% chance of producing a 
callback,66 resumes with African-American sounding names had a 
6.70% chance of doing SO.67 These results represent a difference in 
callback rates of 3.35 percentage points, or 50%.68 Viewed another 
way, the study found that a job applicant with a white sounding 
name can expect one callback for every ten resumes submitted 
while a similar applicant with an African-American sounding name 
can expect one callback for every fifteen resumes submitted.69 
The study'S assessment of the impact of higher quality versus 
lower quality resumes further exemplified the racial discrimination 
in the hiring process. Higher quality resumes from applicants with 
white sounding names produced a callback rate of more than 
11 %,70 while lower quality resumes from applicants with white 
sounding names produced a callback rate of 8.8%.71 Thus, the dif­
ference in callback rates between higher and lower quality resumes 
ECONOMICS 767 (Aug. 2004), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/joumals/pdf/qjec_119_ 
3_767_O.pdf. 
61. BERTRAND & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 2. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. The researchers define a "higher quality" resume as one that indicates 
more experience, fewer holes in employment history, more likely includes an e-mail 
address, indicates the completion of certificate degrees, foreign language skills, and/or 
awards or honors. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 9. 




70. Id. at 12. 
71. Id. 
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was 2.51 percentage points or 30%.72 For applicants with African­
American sounding names, higher quality resumes produced a 
callback rate of 6.99% while lower quality resumes yielded a 
callback rate of 6.41 %.13 Thus, the difference between callback 
rates for higher and lower quality resumes for applicants with Afri­
can-American sounding names is .58 percentage points, or 9%. 
Therefore, applicants with white sounding names were rewarded at 
a substantially higher rate for an increase in credentials than their 
. counterparts with African-American sounding names.14 
Bertrand and Mullainathan also assigned random addresses to 
the resume of each fictional job applicant,75 Within each racial clas­
sification, a portion of each group included addresses from "more 
affluent" neighborhoods.76 By doing so, the researchers sought to 
ascertain the effect of neighborhood status on an applicant's pros­
pects, particularly with respect to the different racial groups.77 This 
feature of the study addressed the notion that African-American 
sounding names serve as a proxy for socioeconomic disadvantage 
rather than exclusively race,7s If this notion is correct with respect 
to hiring patterns, and applicants from affluent neighborhoods are 
appealing to employers, the presence of such a neighborhood 
should compensate for the presence of an African-American 
sounding name on an application. The study, however, did not indi­
cate such a finding.79 While applicants with African-American 
sounding names did benefit from an affluent address, they did not 
benefit at a rate higher than that of applicants with white sounding 
names.SO Thus, the study concluded that an address in an affluent 
neighborhood, while certainly providing benefit to all applicants, 
does not provide the compensation for the African-American 
sounding name that one would expect if that type of name served as 
a proxy for socioeconomic disadvantage.S! Therefore, according to 
the study, the discrimination revealed was not based on socioeco­
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Mullainathan was most troubled by this disparity of these rewards for in­
creased credential statistics. In an interview with the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, he said, 
"That, to me, was the most depressing part. When you show you have skills, you should 
get a huge return, and [blacks] didn't." Johnson, supra note 6, at Dl. 
75. BERTRAND & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 13. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 13-14. 
78. Id. at 20. 
79. Id. See also Fryer & Levitt, supra note 60, at 783-86. 
80. BERTRAND & MULLAlNATHAN, supra note 5, at 20. 
81. Id. 
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nomic disadvantage but race.82 
In sum, the Bertrand and Mullainathan study reflected a 
marked pattern of race-based discrimination in the hiring process.83 
The study revealed that applicants with distinctively African-Amer­
ican sounding names receive drastically less favorable responses 
from employers than those with distinctively white sounding 
names.84 The study further revealed that the presence of an Afri­
can-American sounding name is a proxy for race, as opposed to less 
competitive credentials or socioeconomic disadvantage.85 Thus, the 
study reflected a marked pattern of discrimination in the hiring pro­
cess of American business that is specifically based on race. 
III. CONTRADICTION OR COMPATIBILITY? 
On the surface, the support offered by representatives of big 
business for the Michigan programs and the findings by Bertrand 
and Mullainathan of race-based hiring discrimination appear to be 
wildly contradictory. Of late, corporate America has recognized 
the value of increased minority employment as a result of the rap­
idly growing percentage of the American population comprised of 
minorities and the corresponding increase in minority purchase 
power.86 Thus, it would be reasonable to interpret the amici briefs 
described above as furthering an effort to increase minority hir­
ing.87 Under this reading, these briefs and the findings of Bertrand 
82. Id. Other studies have revealed similar race-based discrimination at different 
stages in the hiring process. In particular, Floyd Weatherspoon described studies con­
ducted by the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington and the Urban Insti­
tute involving the use of black and white testers in interviews. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, 
The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African-American Males: 
An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23, 53 (1994). Black and white testers 
were paired according to similar education, demeanor, and experience. Id. They were 
then trained to give similar responses to questions during the interviews. Id. The stud­
ies revealed that in nearly all instances, "the white male 'testers' were either given the 
job, treated more favorably, encouraged to apply for jobs with the employer, or offered 
the higher level job." Id. Weatherspoon concluded, "[t]hese two employment audits 
illustrate that when employers have an opportunity to hire qualified African- American 
males, they still rely on stereotypical biases to deny them employment." Id. 
83. See BERTRAND & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 26 ("African Americans 
face differential treatment when searching for jobs and this may still be a factor in why 
they do poorly in the labor market."). 
84. Id. at 10. 
85. See id.; see also Fryer & Levitt, supra note 60, at 770 ("Overall, Black choices 
of first names today differ substantially more from Whites than do the names chosen by 
native born Hispanics and Asians."). 
86. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RrVER, 11-12 (1998). 
87. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. This Article does not purport 
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and Mullainathan appear to be starkly inconsistent. If the briefs 
reflect an effort to increase minority hiring, why would businesses 
systematically refuse to hire members of some of those very minori­
ties when given the chance? A closer examination of the briefs, and 
the reading given them by the Court, however, reveals that the sup­
port they exemplify and the study's findings of discriminatory hiring 
practices present no conflict at all, but rather, are quite compatible. 
The compatibility of the findings of race-based discrimination 
in hiring practices and big business's support for the Michigan pro­
grams lies in characterizing its rationale for offering that support. 
Representatives of big business could have based their support of 
the Michigan programs on three potential rationales: (1) a rationale 
that focuses exclusively or primarily on the interests of minorities;88 
(2) a rationale in which its interests converge with those of minori­
ties;89 or (3) a rationale based on interests that are exclusively its 
own and devoid of any minority interests.9o It is because the third 
type of rationale receives primacy in the briefs and exclusivity by 
the Grutter majority that it must be deemed the predominant ratio­
nale. And it is because of this predominance in the rationale rooted 
in exclusively corporate interests - and the eschewing of those 
based on minority interests or interest-convergence - that corpo­
rate support for the Michigan programs and findings of discrimina­
tory hiring practices are indeed compatible .. 
A minority-focused rationale appears nowhere in the briefs 
submitted by representatives of big business in favor of the Michi­
gan programs.91 However, such rationales have been prevalent in 
supporting both the Michigan programs specifically and affirmative 
action in general.92 Therefore, I will return to a discussion of them 
that an increase in minority hiring played no role in corporate America's support of the 
Michigan programs. Rather, it asserts that this motivation was not primary. 
88. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl 1. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: 
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 249-69 (1997). 
89. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
90. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
91. See David Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is 
Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the 
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004) ("Neither corporate brief 
makes more than a passing reference to the moral arguments in favor of helping blacks 
to overcome slavery, segregation, or the stigma of racism ...."). 
92. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 88; Brief of Amicus Curiae, NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. & American Civil Liberties Union, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for NAACP & ACLU]. 
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in conjunction with an examination of rationales eschewed by cor­
porate America in favor of those that are exclusively corporate. 
Representatives of big business did put forth rationales that ex­
emplify interest convergence in their support of the Michigan pro­
grams. That support for affirmative action may be predicated upon 
converging interests emanating from Derrick Bell's theory of inter­
est convergence in explaining civil rights progress.93 In analyzing 
Brown v. Board of Education, Bell explained the concept by stat­
ing, "[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be ac­
commodated only when it converges with the interests of whites."94 
In the context of Brown, Bell asserted that white interests in the 
political and economic gains resulting from school desegregation 
had as much to do with the decision as minority interests in equal 
education.95 Bell's theory has wide-ranging ramifications in analyz­
ing civil rights law and theory.96 It puts forth as a model for certain 
civil rights concepts - such as affirmative action - an incorporation 
of interests of mUltiple constituencies within a single rationale.97 
Put differently, under a rationale predicated upon interest conver­
gence, even if it were not the intent of the party asserting the ratio­
nale to incorporate minority interests, by virtue of the assertion of 
that rationale, minority interests are also furthered when the propo­
nent's interests are. 
Of late, there has been a notable interest on the part of big 
93. Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver­
gence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980). 
94. Id. at 523. 
95. Id. at 524-25 (arguing that Brown "helped to provide immediate credibility to 
America's struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging 
third world peoples" and that it was a reflection of white business leaders' desire to 
"make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sun belt with all its potential 
and profit"). See also FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S 
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 193 (1979) ("[W]ith the rise of 
communism the United States was thrown into intense competition for world domina­
tion, a circumstance that demanded an ideology of 'democracy' and 'freedom.' Increas­
ingly the circumstances prevailing in the South constituted a national embarrassment 
and support for these arrangements by dominant economic interests weakened."). 
96. Richard Delgado's contrasting of Bell's theory with "'utility-based argu­
ments,' [which] justify affirmative action on the ground that increased representation of 
minorities will be useful to society" reflects how Bell's theory serves to critique these 
rationales for affirmative action. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on 
a Review o/Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 569 n.45 (1984). Because I 
ultimately conclude that rationales based on interest convergence were not the primary 
rationales of big business, it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the social 
desirability of such rationales. 
97. In the context of the Michigan programs, the interests that converge are those 
of minorities in obtaining employment and corporations in increasing minority hiring. 
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business in increasing minority employment.98 Several arguments 
expressed in the briefs at issue reflect this interest.99 These argu­
ments, while rooted in the contexts of corporate interests, represent 
a convergence of those interests with the interests of minorities in 
obtaining employment. Because these arguments run concurrent 
with minority interests in obtaining employment - no matter their 
lack of explicit concern for the minority interest itself - they seem 
to render this support for both Michigan programs antithetical to 
the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan. To that end, it would 
seem inconsistent for corporate America to discriminate against ra­
cial minorities in the hiring process if its support for the Michigan 
programs were primarily rooted in the interest-converging rationale 
of increasing minority hiring. 
A closer examination of the briefs - and the reading the Court 
gave them - reveals a primary corporate interest that does not con­
verge with minority interests in employment. The bulk of corporate 
interests in a race-based university admissions program has little to 
do with increasing minority employment. Rather, the interest given 
primacy, by both amici and the Court, is the exposure of potential 
employees, regardless of race, to members of minority races while 
attending a university (hereinafter "exposure rationale"). Because 
the support of big business for the Michigan programs reflects less 
of a concern for hiring minorities than for hiring employees who 
were exposed to minorities as students, that support and the find­
ings of Bertrand and Mullainathan are not contradictory. Further­
more, when the presence of rationales that more readily further the 
interests of minorities are present but eschewed, the support that 
does exist and the findings of discriminatory hiring practices appear 
to be quite compatible. 
Unlike the rationales based on interest convergence, the expo­
sure rationale is one rooted exclusively in corporate interests and is 
utterly devoid of minority interests in employment. The basic tenet 
of the exposure rationale is succinctly explained by the Brief of Ex­
xonMobil Corporation, which states: 
98. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
99. See Brief for 65 American Businesses, supra note 3, at 7 ("[A] racially diverse 
group of managers ... is better able to work with business partners, employees, and 
clientele in the United States and around the world."); Brief of Amicus Curiae Gen. 
Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 23 ("If courts prohibit institutions of higher learning 
from using race as a factor in admissions, businesses will find it more difficult to hire 
superbly trained minority candidates."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Media Compa­
nies, supra note 3, at 2 ("Amici actively seek minority applicants ...."). 
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[A]n institution with a culturally diverse student body produce[s] 
graduates possessing the variety of perspectives that ExxonMobil 
views as paramount to its success as a global business ... all indi­
viduals educated at such an institution benefit from exposure to 
students of widely diverse backgrounds-and this exposure, in 
turn, benefits their employers. loo 
Thus, according to the exposure rationale, it is beneficial for 
business to hire employees who were exposed to minority view­
points while students; as such, it is correspondingly beneficial to 
business for universities to include minorities in their student 
bodies. 
The exposure of students to minority viewpoints that big busi­
ness sought in its support of the Michigan programs is a common 
occurrence in institutions of higher education. The implicit respon­
sibility of exposing an entire student body to minority viewpoints is 
very real for minority students. In describing their experiences, 
Leslie Espinoza wrote, "[m]inority law students [are] a symbol for 
their race. They are expected to have an unending commitment to 
the 'community,' beginning with the law school community."101 
Correspondingly, the presence of minorities generally produces the 
desired exposure on the whole of a student body. In response to a 
recent study conducted at the University of Florida College of Law 
focusing on the effects of race and ethnicity in legal education, 
"[a]lmost 70% of students agreed or strongly agreed that racial/eth­
nic and gender diversity 'enhances [their] ability to get along better 
with members of other races.' "102 Thus, in supporting the Michigan 
programs based on the premise that minority students would ex­
pose the entire student body to minority viewpoints, representa­
tives of big business had solid reason to believe that such exposure 
would actually occur. 
The primacy of the exposure rationale is present in the Brief 
for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses. While this brief 
does include the argument that corporate interests converge with 
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae ExxonMobil Corp., supra note 3, at 4. 
101. Leslie Espinoza, Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law Student 
Support Programs: Constructing Affirmative Action, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 291 
(1989). See also Rachel F. Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of 
One, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 503, 512 (1986). Citing a similar phenomenon that occurs for 
law faculty, Moran writes, "[s]ome students and faculty will expect the minority or wo­
man professor to serve as a representative of all minorities and women." Id. 
102. Nancy E. Dowd & Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity Matters: Race, Gender, and 
Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 J.L. & PUB. POL'y 11,25 (2003). 
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minority interests,103 the bulk of the rationale supports corporate 
interests in hiring employees exposed to minority viewpoints. Such 
an interest lacks any convergence with minority interests in 
employment. 
Amici's primary rationale is eVident in the "Introduction and 
Summary of Argument," in which the brief offers nothing concern­
ing an increase in minority employment but does state that, "[i]t is 
essential that [students] be educated in an environment where they 
are exposed to diverse people, ideas, perspectives, and interac­
tions."l04 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, amici delineated four 
specific benefits they derived from a university's consideration of 
race in its admissions policy.105 One of those benefits, as noted in 
this section, was a corporate interest in increasing minority employ­
ment, an asserted benefit in which corporate interests converge 
with minority interests in employment.106 However, the remaining 
three asserted benefits strongly reflected corporate interests in hir­
ing employees who were exposed to minorities as students, an inter­
est that is devoid of any concern for minority hiring.107 Therefore, 
the Brieffor Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses is more 
firmly rooted in the corporate interest of hiring employees who 
have been exposed to diversity rather than hiring a diverse 
workforce. 
The brief submitted by General Motors Corporation even fur­
ther exemplifies the corporate interest in hiring employees exposed 
to minorities as students rather than hiring the minorities them­
selves. As noted above, General Motors quantifies this notion in 
the term "cross-cultural competence."108 This concept is central to 
the corporation's rationale for supporting the Michigan pro­
grams.109 What is particularly noteworthy about this concept is that 
it is quantified as a skill to be acquired by potential employees of 
the corporation. Inherent in the above-referenced definition is that 
acquisition of cross-cultural competence occurs most readily 
through exposure to students from a diversity of racial groups.ll0 
103. See supra note 99. 
104. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 3, at 2. 
105. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra note 99. 
107. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Specifically, the three asserted 
benefits that reflect no convergence between corporate interests and minority interests 
are the first, second, and fourth. 
108. See Brief of Amici Curiae General Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 4. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 18 ("Open-mindedness and complex thinking are skills best honed 
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General Motors linked the availability of that exposure to the pres­
ence of minorities in a university setting,111 Presumably, it would 
follow, acquisition of this skill would be most significant for those 
who presently lack it. And those who presently lack it would pre­
sumably be those who correspondingly lack exposure to minority 
viewpoints prior to their university experience.112 And, it would 
seemingly follow, those who lack exposure to minority viewpoints 
would more readily be members of the majority group, as minority 
students would enter the university setting with that exposure al­
ready.113 Thus, General Motors' interest in the acquisition of cross­
cultural competence by its employees more readily reflected an in­
terest in employing members of majority groups who have been ex­
posed to members of minority groups as students than in employing 
members of minority groups themselves. 
The corporate interest in hiring employees who have been ex­
posed to minorities in college is also given primacy by the Grutter 
majority in legitimizing the Law School's use of race in its admis­
sions program. As noted above, the Court specifically cited the 
briefs submitted by representatives of big business in arriving at a 
rationale for its holding.114 Furthermore, the Court focused specifi­
cally on the exposure rationale when citing business interest, noting 
that "major American businesses have made clear that the skills 
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be de­
veloped through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, 
and viewpoints."115 The Court did cite rationales based on interest­
convergence when referring to briefs from other segments of soci­
ety, such as the military. However, in referring to the briefs submit­
ted by business, the Court gave primacy to the exposure rationale. 
Thus, like amici themselves, the Court, when giving its reading of 
business interests, eschewed rationales supporting these admissions 
programs that either focus on or converge with minority interests in 
favor of those that are exclusively corporate. 
In contrast to the exposure rationale, other examples of recent 
support for affirmative action have not been so devoid of minority 
through exposure to multiple ideas and challenging debate in an educational environ­
ment .... [R]acial and ethnic diversity enhances this process ...."). 
111. See id. at 20 n.2. 
112. See id. at 19 ("Selective academic institutions offer a large percentage of 
white students their first and last opportunity for significant contact with persons of 
other races and cultures prior to entering the working world."). 
113. Id. 
114. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
115. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
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interest. Examples abound that reflect both a minority-focused ra­
tionale and an interest-convergence rationale. Such examples exist 
both in the support for other sectors of society for the Michigan 
programs and in recent case law. 
An amicus brief filed by the NAACP and ACLU reflects sup­
port for the Michigan programs based on a minority-focused ratio­
nale. It centered on minority interests in remedying past 
discrimination and the role the Michigan programs may play in fur­
thering those interests.116 The underlying premise of the brief is the 
presence of continuing and systemic race-based discrimination, spe­
cifically "widespread racial inequality [as] a fundamental fact of 
American life."117 The brief then detailed a variety of contexts in 
which this systemic discrimination exists, including housing, educa­
tional opportunities, job prospects, and health care.llS The brief's 
proponents characterized the Michigan programs as an effort "to 
redress systemic racial inequity."119 Thus, the brief submitted by 
the NAACP and ACLU represents a minority-focused rationale for 
supporting the Michigan programs; it promotes the interests of mi­
norities in remedying the effects of discrimination as the basis for 
their support. 
An amicus brief filed by former high ranking officers of the 
United States military in support of the Michigan programs repre­
sents a rationale based on the convergence of interests.120 The brief 
premised its support on the notion that the American military oper­
ates most effectively when its officer corps includes significant mi­
nority representation.121 According to the brief's proponents, 
military benefits derived from an officer corps with minority repre­
sentation include a decrease in racial tension, a more effective flow 
of communication throughout the force, and a more favorable over­
all perception of minorities who make up a sizeable portion of the 
American military.122 The argument continued that these benefits 
lead to greater military cohesion, which, in turn, leads to a more 
116. Brief for NAACP & ACLU, supra note 92. 
117. Id. at 13. 
118. Id. at 13·22. 
119. Id. at 3. 
120. Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, et aI., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02·241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02.516). 
121. Id. at 5. 
122. Id. at 14 (describing how an officer corps that lacks minority representation 
produces the opposite of these objectives). 
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effective military.123 Thus, the brief's proponents established a link 
between the military's interest in effectiveness and its interest in 
minority's presence in its officer corps. Therefore, this brief put 
forth a rationale for supporting the Michigan programs which are 
rooted in a convergence of interests - the military's in effectiveness 
and minority's in officer placement. 
A similar rationale for supporting affirmative action is present 
in recent case law. In Petit v. City of Chicago ,124 the Seventh Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals upheld an employment promotion affirma­
tive action program using a rationale representing a convergence of 
employer and minority interests.125 The case involved a challenge 
against the Chicago Police Department by non-minority police of­
ficers who applied for promotion to the rank of sergeant but were 
denied.126 The plaintiffs alleged that the affirmative action plan vi­
olated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment.127 The promotions were awarded based on an 
examination, the scores of which were then standardized for race 
and ethnicity.128 The court found the Police Department had an 
interest in increasing its numbers of minority sergeants "to enhance 
the operations of the [Chicago Police Department]."129 As such, it 
had a compelling state interest to enact the affirmative action pro­
gram.130 Thus, the Police Department's interests in promoting mi­
norities converged with minority interests in obtaining promotion. 
The court gave credence to additional minority interests in detailing 
why the Police Department may take such a position. Specifically, 
the court noted that in a racially and ethnically diverse city such as 
Chicago, minority representation in the police department im­
proves police-community relations, which, in tum, allows police to 
serve the community more effectively.l3l Thus, Petit reflects an af­
123. Id. (arguing how an officer corps that lacks minority representation "under­
mines military effectiveness"). 
124. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003). 
125. Id. at 1114. 
126. Id. at 1112. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1117. The court explained that the standardizing of test scores is a 
statistical process "of removing differences between ... two or more groups of test­
takers." Id. In this case, the Police Department had found elements of test design that 
favored white test-takers and decided to standardize for race and ethnicity accordingly. 
Id. 
129. Id. at 1114. 
130. Id. at 1115. The court further held that the means of the program were nar­
rowly tailored to its goals, such that it is constitutional. Id. at 1117. 
131. Id. at 1115. 
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firmative action program whose rationale represents a convergence 
of employer interests in increased effectiveness and minority inter­
ests in obtaining promotions and good policing. 
Unlike the NAACP and ACLU brief, the brief submitted by 
military representatives, or the Petit court, the briefs submitted by 
representatives of big business eschewed as primary either a minor­
ity-focused rationale or an interest-convergence rationale for sup­
porting the Michigan programs. In contrast to the NAACP and 
ACLU briefs, the briefs submitted by business representatives are 
completely devoid of a minority-focused argument.132 The differ­
ence in rationale may be attributed to the difference in the stated 
purpose of the organizational proponents,133 However, the point 
remains that had the briefs submitted by representatives of big busi­
ness employed a minority-focused rationale, its support for the 
Michigan programs and the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan 
would have been contradictory. 
The primary rationale of the briefs submitted by representa­
tives of big business also diverged from the interest convergence 
rationales put forth in the briefs submitted by military representa­
tives and the Petit court.134 The rationales put forth by the latter 
two are rooted in an interest in increasing minority hiring. Unlike 
the NAACP & ACLU brief, while this rationale does not center on 
an express concern for minority plight, it does implicate minority 
interests in obtaining employment and promotion. That is, if the 
132. See supra note 91. 
133. See Brief for NAACP & ACLU, supra note 92, at 1. 
134. In a recent article, Kenneth L. Karst wrote of the similarities between the 
brief submitted by military representatives and the briefs submitted by representatives 
of big business. Kenneth L. Karst, Symposium: The Revival of Forward-Looking Af­
firmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 64-68 (2004). Karst noted that both include 
an argument expressing a desire to increase minority hiring and concluded, "[t]he paral­
lels between [The General Motors Corp.] brief and the brief focused on the armed 
services are striking." Id. at 68. While, as noted earlier, I agree that both briefs do 
include this argument, I disagree that the two are "parallel." The desire to increase 
minority hiring is given primacy in the brief of military representatives, but the ratio­
nale given primacy in the brief of the representatives of big business is the exposure 
rationale. One only has to look at the difference in treatment given the two by the 
Grutter majority to see this difference. The Court referred to both in deeming the Law 
School's program constitutional. However, when referring to the support of big busi­
ness, it stated: "Major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed ... 
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). When referring to the brief 
of the military representatives, the Court cited the military's need for a "racially diverse 
officer corps." Id. at 331. Thus, the Court's respective selections reflect the primacy of 
the exposure rationale in the briefs of representatives of big business and the desire to 
increase minority hiring in the brief of military representatives. 
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interests of the military in employing minority officers and the in­
terest of the Chicago Police Department in promoting minorities to 
the rank of sergeant are furthered, minority interests in employ­
ment and promotion will also be furthered. Thus, had representa­
tives of big business asserted this rationale as primary, their support 
for the Michigan programs and the findings of Bertrand and Mul­
lainathan would also have been contradictory. 
However, representatives of big business did not put forth as 
primary either a minority-focused or interest-convergence rationale 
in supporting the Michigan programs. Instead, their briefs assert as 
primary the exclusively corporate exposure rationale. That the pro­
ponents of the business briefs eschewed those in which minority in­
terests would be furthered in favor of those that fail to further 
minority interests, reflects a low priority of furthering the interests 
of minorities in securing a place in the business world. It is here 
that the compatibility between big business's support for the Michi­
gan programs and the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan be­
comes apparent. As previously noted, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
demonstrated that the discrimination they found was not based on 
socioeconomic status but race.135 Corporate America's support for 
the Michigan programs accounted for race and the benefits of the 
presence of racial difference in the university setting. However, the 
striking primacy given to rationales that do not reflect a similar val­
uation of racial difference in hiring practices - when such rationales 
are readily available - reflects a lack of similar valuation of racial 
difference at the hiring stage. As such, when presented with such a 
stark pattern of race-based discrimination as appears in the findings 
of Bertrand and Mullainathan, the briefs submitted by similar rep­
resentatives of big business should be viewed as compatible, not 
contradictory. 
CONCLUSION 
Two developments of 2003 reflecting the attitude of American 
business toward racial difference - the Grutter and Gratz decisions 
and publication of the study conducted by Bertrand and Mul­
lainathan - appear to be wildly contradictory. The former repre­
sented the culmination of support for race-based affirmative action 
programs in university admissions; the latter revealed systemic ra­
cial discrimination in hiring practices. The apparent contradiction, 
however, may be reconciled by closely examining the primary ratio­
135. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
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nale representatives of big business asserted in offering their sup­
port. That rationale is most aptly characterized as the exposure 
rationale, a justification rooted in exclusively corporate interests 
and devoid of minority interests. As such, the filing of the amicus 
briefs supporting the Michigan programs and results of the study 
present no contradiction but rather compatibility. 
